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AT 9 P.M. ON MARCH 18, 2014, HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS STORMED
Taiwan’s national legislature to oppose the ruling party’s railroad-
ing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a free
trade pact with China. What was originally planned as a sit-in
protest unexpectedly evolved into a political crisis, as the so-called
Sunflower Movement1 occupied the plenary conference chamber
for twenty-four days, disrupting the regular working of the Legisla-
tive Yuan. On March 30, an unusually large protest rally of purport-
edly 500,000 people took place to emphasize four principal
demands: (1) to withdraw the CSSTA from the legislature, (2) to
enact the bill on Cross-Strait Agreement Supervision (CSAS), (3) to
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legislate the CSAS bill before the legal review of CSSTA, and (4)
to convene a citizens’ constitutional conference (gongmin xianzheng
huiyi).
Throughout the stalemate, President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuo-
mintang (KMT) remained adamant in his support of the CSSTA,
though he appeared somewhat more accommodating to the idea of
codifying the CSAS law and convening a national affairs conference.
On April 6, Wang Jin-pyng, the KMT Legislative Yuan speaker
whose relationship with Ma Ying-jeou had turned bitter since the pre-
vious year, intervened by promising not to put the CSSTA on the
agenda until the CSAS law passed. Wang’s declaration soon won
endorsement by other KMT heavyweights, who clearly thought Ma’s
hard-liner approach was not conducive to settling the political crisis.
Exploiting this visible split within the KMT, the Sunflower leaders
declared they had “finished the mission of the current stage and
secured significant achievement.”2 Four days later, the students and
their allies evacuated the Legislative Yuan, thus concluding the
highly dramatized standoff that had drawn national as well as inter-
national attention.
The student-initiated protest amounted to the biggest challenge
to Ma Ying-jeou’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), which had successfully deescalated the military tension
and strengthened economic exchange without being able to assuage
popular suspicion of China’s political and territorial ambitions over
Taiwan (Chu 2011, 149–152). It also dealt an embarrassing blow to
the opposition, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was
struggling to readjust its traditional pro-independence stance to the
reality of a more assertive and powerful PRC (Schubert and Braig
2011, 87), especially after two consecutive defeats in presidential
elections. Prior to the protest, the DPP opted for an article-by-article
review of CSSTA rather than an outright rejection; however, once the
congress was occupied, the DPP decided to back the students’
demand to scrap the current CSSTA version.
The Sunflower Movement is intellectually intriguing in many
ways. Generally speaking, Taiwan’s society was not a fertile ground
for radical protests. According to a comparative study on East Asian
countries, the Taiwanese showed only slightly more willingness to
participate in social movement activities (signing a petition, joining
boycotts, and attending demonstrations) than the renowned law-
abiding Singaporeans, and much less than the Japanese and South
Koreans (Sonoda 2012, 7). The Sunflower activists, therefore, over-
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came the low public tolerance for disruptive protest to orchestrate a
powerful challenge to the government. The sustained congress occu-
pation created a political stalemate, but contrary to some expecta-
tions it did not generate negative economic impacts. Outside the
protest zone around the Legislative Yuan, most citizens’ daily rou-
tines went on as usual. Taiwan’s stock market took a dive in the first
three days of the occupation; nevertheless, the stock index soon
returned to normal, even ending up 2.4 percent higher on the day that
students ended their protest, compared to March 18. It is also remark-
able that the students’ radical act of seizing the national legislature
enjoyed broad popular support. A TVBS poll on March 20–21
showed 70 percent of respondents agreed with the demand to review
the CSSTA on an article-by-article basis and 48 percent supported the
occupation of congress (with 40 percent opposed).3
Perhaps the biggest puzzle consists in how the Sunflower
activists were able to mount such a radical protest, thereby generat-
ing a protracted confrontation with the authorities. Why did they
avoid a calamitous defeat when the government leaders stood their
ground firmly? Globally, there have only been a few cases of student
activism that paralyzed the normal functioning of a governmental
branch and yet managed to make a glorious retreat. Building on
Charles Tilly’s (1978) polity model and the subsequent debate on
political opportunity and strategy, I will develop a theoretical
approach to explain what made the Sunflower Movement possible.
I argue that neither the political opportunity structure approach—
with its emphasis on enduring institutions—nor a purely strategic
approach emphasizing tactical moves and bargaining is adequate to
understand this case and other examples of contentious politics.
Rather, I develop a modified polity model that emphasizes intra-elite
divisions and the role of alliances with institutional actors as impor-
tant determinants of protest success. 
A Modified Polity Model: 
Political Opportunity, Threat, and Strategy
Central to the Tillyan model is conceptualization of the relation
between protesters and the government as a process of political inter-
action. The government makes up the core of the “polity,” which also
includes “members” that possess “routine and low-cost access” to
official resources, such as the ruling parties. The social movement
plays the role of a “challenger,” which seeks to advance a claim
whose realization will conflict with the interests of those who control
the government (Tilly 1978, 52–53). The polity model highlights the
power disparity between polity members and a social movement,
which explains why the latter often emerges as a contender that relies
heavily on extra-institutional means. A social movement is able to
mobilize an effective challenge when its constituencies are organized
internally for their shared interests. A social movement is also
affected by a series of external factors that facilitate or repress its
protest activity. Tilly (1978, 100, 133) identifies this political dimen-
sion as “opportunity/threat.” The couplet formulation is intended to
highlight that the responses of political incumbents can increase the
opportunity or decrease the threat of movement success through a
mix of repression and concessions. Tilly’s original conceptualization
implies a continuum of opportunity and threat in any given setting
characterized by contentious politics.
Later researchers developed Tilly’s seminal idea into the concept
of “political opportunity structure” (POS) (McAdam 1982; Meyer
1990; Tarrow 1989). POS essentially means “the features of regimes
and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective
action” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 49), or those state-related variables
that encourage or discourage social movements. To make POS more
operational, scholars have identified its components, which include
stability of the regime, existence of influential allies, availability of
policy channels, the state’s repressive capacity, and so on (McAdam
1996; Tarrow 1996). This theory predicts that a social movement
emerges in response to the opening up of POS and goes into
inevitable decline when POS contracts. In stable democracies, social
movements regularly undergo a rising and falling cyclical pattern
because a favorable POS always emerges as a transitory phenome-
non, bookended by longer periods of tranquility during which oppor-
tunities for protest-making are minimal.
Yet, with the gradual consolidation of POS as a basic vocabulary
for social movement research come its detractors. First, critics con-
tend that opportunity does not exist without subjective evaluation. A
favorable POS generates movement activism insofar as collective
actors are capable of perceiving and seizing it (Goodwin and Jasper
1999; Kurzman 1996). The term POS is criticized as an oxymoron
because opportunity is inherently subjective whereas structure is
objective (Jasper 2012).
Second, it is argued that in some cases social movements actu-
ally happen in spite of adverse POS. Researchers argue that the neg-
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ative turn in a political situation often functions as a wake-up call to
complacent or dormant activists (Koopmans and Statham 1999;
Moodie 2002; Rucht 1996). If there is radical indeterminacy between
POS and activism, the analytical value of the concept is greatly com-
promised. Indeed, a number of researchers have advocated abandon-
ing the POS concept for a less deterministic understanding of the
political situation that confronts movement activists (Amenta and
Halfmann 2012; Goldstone 2004; Kriesi 2004).
Finally, since the POS theory represents the most sophisticated
attempt to understand the dynamics of social movements on a struc-
turalist basis, disenchantment with it naturally encourages a revival of
agency-based conceptualization. The strategy model is back in fashion,
which sees social movements as a recurring process of interaction with
the movement opponents (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Jasper 2004).
In analyzing large antiregime protests, which are characterized
by an intensive yet relatively short episode of contention, in this arti-
cle I maintain that it is possible to reconstruct an analytical frame-
work out of the recent debate between POS and strategy models.
First, the original polity model emphasizes the disadvantaged posi-
tion of social movements vis-à-vis government incumbents who con-
trol the means of repression—an insight the strategy model advocates
appear to have neglected. Particularly in the context of antiregime
protests, where high-profile challenges are directed at the incum-
bents’ legitimacy and not merely their specific policies, governments
tend to be less tolerant and more ready to use repression.
Another merit of the polity model consists in its stress on the
interactive relation between protesters and incumbents, which is irre-
trievably lost in the structuralist formulation of POS. Many classical
POS studies aim at understanding how long-term social changes
affect political institutions so as to offer a window of opportunity for
movement activism. The benefit of a shorter observation period for
the interaction between antiregime protesters and political leaders is
that we can more or less put institutions in the background, as they
do not usually experience rapid change. Moreover, such contention
entails high-stakes consequences since paralyzing a governmental
branch easily justifies harsher responses from the incumbents, which
can even come with casualties. Hence, strategic calculation plays a
more prominent role in structuring the dynamics and outcomes of
movement activism.
Finally, the POS theorists fail to tap a vital conceptual resource
in the seminal polity model. Originally Tilly developed opportunity
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and threat in a single dimension (opportunity being the absence of
threat). Later on, Tilly and his students separated them into two dis-
tinct concepts. The revision was made to take into consideration
that it is possible that a hostile gesture by government officials
actually provokes rather than dampens protest activities. A relevant
case here is how the inflammatory April 26 editorial in the People’s
Daily fueled the Beijing students’ activism that led up to the
Tiananmen incident in 1989 (Calhoun 1994, 47–49). An unsophisti-
cated use of the POS perspective might have identified such a situ-
ation as a closure of opportunity, whereas threat would be a more
appropriate characterization there. In other words, threat, defined as
“the cost it [a social group] expects to suffer if it does not take
action” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 183), stimulated more protest
activities. 
Therefore a modified polity model is capable of explaining the
development of antiregime protests by synthesizing the opposing
camps in the POS debate. To build that theoretical perspective on an
interactive basis, the discussion on opportunity and threat needs to be
reformulated to accommodate the strategic dimension of protest.
Hereafter in this article I will abandon the already overburdened term
POS and instead use political opportunity or opportunity, strictly
defined as “those behaviors by government incumbents or polity
members that lower the cost of protest mobilization.” 
In the list of political opportunities outlined by leading scholars
(McAdam 1996, 27; Tarrow 1996, 54–56; 2011, 165–167; Tilly and
Tarrow 2007, 57), some items refer to the institutional features of a
political regime, such as openness of the political system, state
capacity, propensity for repression, and political access, which usu-
ally do not undergo rapid change in a short period of time and hence
can be seen as a stable background. Yet, there are two kinds of polit-
ical opportunities that are of particular relevance here. First, elite dis-
unity invites protests because movement activists can exploit the
inconsistency among officials to justify their contentious behavior.
Repression becomes less likely because of the dissenting voices
within the government. In the literature of democratization, the split
between reformers and hard-liners is often seen as a starting signal
for political transition that encourages the opposition movement
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19; Przeworski 1986, 56). Both
China’s Tiananmen movement in 1989 and Taiwan’s Wild Lily
movement in 1990 originated from the widening conflict between
reformers and conservatives within the regime (Wright 2001).
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Somewhat related to this first source of opportunity is the emer-
gence of influential allies with institutional access that favors the
extra-institutional contenders. No matter how well a social move-
ment is organized, it lacks institutional avenues to the formalized
decisionmaking arenas that an established political party enjoys.
Therefore endorsement by an opposition party usually enhances its
political impact (Maguire 1995). 
While elite disunity and influential allies reduce the cost of anti-
regime protests, they should not be seen as structural preconditions for
protest as the POS tradition implies. It is possible that politicians’
struggle for power, such as their split, factionalism, and coalition-
building, inadvertently creates consequences that empower certain
social movements. Moreover, we have to pay attention to situations
where movement leaders employ strategies that explicitly aim at creat-
ing a split among elites or enlisting their sponsorship. In other words,
social movements do not merely respond to the emergence of favor-
able circumstances, but also attempt to create political opportunity.
Finally, the earlier view of threat implies it is a “negative oppor-
tunity,” such as repression; nevertheless Tilly’s later conceptualization
puts it in a different category. In other words, threat means the
increased cost of inaction, rather than that of collective action. Threat
also originates from the behaviors of government incumbents or
polity members, but it stimulates protest not because preexisting polit-
ical hindrance to collective action is overcome but rather because it
spreads a sense of urgency. Movement follows opportunity because a
strategic assessment indicates the greater likelihood of success,
whereas threat is more psychological since the fear of the worst sce-
nario motivates participation. A classic example is how the US
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973, which struck down
all state restrictions on abortion, triggered the prolife movement
(Luker 1984, 126–127). The conservatives mobilized their counter-
movement because they perceived the fundamental value of mother-
hood was undermined, not because the cost of collective action was
radically altered. It follows that threat might emerge without notice-
able change in the level of political opportunity, and vice versa. Fur-
thermore, the decline of threat is expected to dampen movement par-
ticipation, and consequently we can expect movement leaders to
deploy strategies to maximize the mobilizing effect of threat.
With the concepts of political opportunity, threat, and strategy, it
is possible to construct a modified polity model for Taiwan’s Sun-
flower Movement. I will argue that (1) the KMT’s abrupt decision to
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railroad the CSSTA not only violated regular legislative procedure
but also created an acute sense of threat that encouraged movement
participation; (2) it also triggered elite realignment by pushing the
DPP toward determined opposition to the CSSTA—a favorable shift
to the Sunflower Movement; and (3) the occupation of the legislature
was facilitated by the internal split within the KMT.
Research Questions and Data
What kinds of opportunity or threat gave rise to this unusual con-
gress occupation? How did elite disunity and the acquisition of influ-
ential allies affect the movement’s course? Once a political standoff
came into being, what were the strategic responses from the move-
ment and the government? Last, how were the Sunflower leaders
able to secure a slightly favorable outcome eventually even though
the government remained intransigent? I will examine the twenty-
four-day strategic interaction to answer these questions.
The research data come from many sources. I conducted field
observations during the protest and I used journalistic reports and
various online sources. After the conclusion of the occupation, I con-
ducted in-depth interviews with twenty-two involved persons. My
sample includes twelve students, five nongovernmental organization
(NGO) workers or volunteers, and five DPP political workers
(including one lawmaker). Strategic issues are mostly internal to the
movement camp, and hence my interpretation relies more on the
unpublished sources of data. I will first contextualize the CSSTA
controversy in evolving Taiwan-China relations before analyzing the
politics of the movement.
The CSSTA Dispute in Context
During his first presidential term (2008–2012), Ma Ying-jeou’s stated
effort to normalize cross-strait relations with China culminated in the
signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
in 2010, a preferential agreement to bilaterally reduce tariff and com-
mercial barriers. The ECFA signified a major political victory for
Ma’s government because it showed a more cooperative approach to
China was able to secure economic benefits. The DPP’s initial oppo-
sition and the subsequent about-face further lent credibility to the
KMT’s claim. The ECFA also met the PRC’s declared strategy in
“making full use of the mainland’s economic clout” (Keng and Schu-
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bert 2010, 289) to lure Taiwan into a closer relationship. Therefore
promoting greater economic integration through cooperative cross-
strait interaction represented a win-win situation for the KMT and
the PRC, effectively marginalizing the DPP. 
With the breakthrough of the ECFA, officials on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait have been busy negotiating new agreements. As of
March 2014, there have been twenty-one agreements that were
signed without arousing significant opposition, and the CSSTA was
the nineteenth one, which was signed on June 21, 2013. The post-
ECFA evolution led to the KMT government’s confidence that the
CSSTA’s passage would be successful. With the DPP struggling to
shake off the “anti-China” (fengzhong bifan) label, the KMT could
reasonably expect weak resistance in the national legislature. The
DPP’s official stance on economic agreements with China was that
they should conform to the international norms of reciprocity and
transparency and mitigate the disadvantages faced by Taiwan’s
enterprises (DPP 2014, 35). On June 25, 2013, four days after the
CSSTA’s official signing, the KMT and DPP legislators reached an
agreement to “review and vote the CSSTA on the article-by-article
basis,” which represented the DPP’s official position on this issue.
Across the political spectrum, the only outright opposition to the
CSSTA came from the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), a pro-
independence minority party with only three seats in the Legislative
Yuan.4
However, the KMT government clearly underestimated the back-
lash from civil society, business, and professional interests that
would be negatively affected by the CSSTA. The free trade talk with
China was conducted in an excessively secretive manner; practically
no domestic trade leaders or representatives had been consulted or
informed in advance. It was only in the few days before the official
signing that the public learned a sweeping liberalization of Taiwan’s
service sector was imminent. The details of the sixty-four categories
of service industries that would be opened up to Chinese investment
and manpower were announced after the treaty was finalized. Hao
Mingyi, a staunch Ma Ying-jeou supporter and a leading publisher,
initiated the opposition to the CSSTA. According to Hao, allowing
Chinese investment in Taiwan’s printing industry without asking
China to lift its censorship on published books from Taiwan would
wreak havoc on Taiwan’s publishing trade. Later he gave up his posi-
tion of presidential adviser to protest “the neglect of national security
and violation of democracy.” Artists, medical workers, social work-
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ers, and hair-dressing and cosmetic professionals then raised other
concerns over the CSSTA.
The summer of 2013 witnessed growing opposition from civil
society. A coalition composed of leading NGOs on labor, gender,
environmental, welfare, and human rights issues, the Democratic
Front Against Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (DF), was
established on July 28. The DF was led by activist lawyer Lai
Zhongqiang, who had been working hard to increase the attention of
civil society organizations regarding cross-strait issues since the
ECFA became effective. The DF argued for more oversight and trans-
parency over cross-strait negotiations and insisted that civil society
organizations should be allowed to play a larger role. It was due to
Lai’s legal expertise and the DF’s criticisms that the public came to
view the CSSTA as a “black box” (heixiang) process in which pub-
lic oversight was minimal—a damaging criticism that the KMT
incumbents found hard to shake off.
While the DF represented the more established wing of Taiwan’s
civil society, activist students set up the Black Island Nation Youth
Front (BIY) on September 9, which had launched several disruptive
protests at the presidential office and legislature. Taiwan’s student
activism was revived in 2008 when the so-called Wild Strawberry
Movement emerged to protest human rights violations after the
newly installed KMT government rolled out the red carpet for a Chi-
nese envoy in November. Although the Wild Strawberry protesters
failed to obtain an official apology, they inspired a new cohort of
activist students. Since 2008, many new dissident groups emerged in
major colleges, and students have been increasingly involved with
social protests over environmental, urban renewal, land expropria-
tion, and media monopoly issues. A nationwide activist student net-
work came into being due to their shared movement participation as
well as developments in mobile communication technology and
social media websites (Ho 2014a). Hence, although the BIY had
fewer than twenty participants at its founding, it was firmly embed-
ded in a growing movement network of Taiwan’s youth.
The DF and BIY’s joint efforts persuaded the national legislature
to collect more information before starting to review the CSSTA.
From July 2013 to March 2014, twenty public hearings have been
held, of which KMT legislators chaired twelve and DPP eight. There
was intensive use of legislative tactics by both camps. The KMT
attempted to expedite the process by hastily holding three public
hearing sessions within eight days, while the DPP cautiously navi-
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gated between pressure from the anti-CSSTA camp and its desire to
avoid the anti-China charge by chairing a public hearing every two
weeks.
“The 30-Second Incident”: 
Threat and Elite Realignment 
The final public hearing ended on March 10, and then the CSSTA
was ready to be processed by the Internal Administration Committee
of the Legislative Yuan. A DPP lawmaker was scheduled to chair the
committee on March 12, but the KMT did not accept the idea that the
opposition party could set the agenda on the CSSTA’s second read-
ing. So the CSSTA was delayed for one week until the KMT law-
maker Chang Ching-chung became the rotating chair of that commit-
tee. On the afternoon of March 17, Chang attempted to mount the
podium surrounded by the DPP lawmakers without success. Instead
he used a private microphone to announce that the second reading of
the CSSTA was finished and ready for the plenary review. In thirty
seconds, Chang formally concluded the session, leaving the DPP leg-
islators and reporters bewildered. The KMT’s parliamentary tactics
amounted to a flagrant violation of the agreement to “review and
vote the CSSTA on an article-by-article basis.” Three DPP legislators
decided to stage a hunger strike protest on the afternoon of the fol-
lowing day; however, this was immediately overshadowed by the
occupation of the Legislative Yuan several hours later.
Anti-CSSTA activists did not expect the KMT to choose this
nuclear option. Prior to Chang’s “30-second incident” on March 17,
the DF was planning a booklet on the CSSTA’s threat to Taiwanese
economy and society, while the BIY was discussing nationwide cam-
pus talks to arouse more students’ attention. Both groups were then
struggling to bring more public attention to the CSSTA’s technicali-
ties, which baffled most laypersons. Yet, the KMT’s hurried pushing
through inadvertently aroused the spotlight that the CSSTA oppo-
nents badly needed. 
As a matter of fact, an opinion poll taken one week after finaliz-
ing the bilateral talks on the CSSTA in June 2013, indicated that 47.4
percent of respondents thought the treaty disadvantageous and only
24.9 percent considered it advantageous (24.4 percent declined to
answer).5 According to the Taiwan Social Change Survey conducted
in late 2013, skepticism over cross-strait economic integration was
prevalent: 73.7 percent and 53.9 percent of respondents held negative
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attitudes toward “mainland Chinese working in Taiwan” and “Tai-
wanese going to mainland China for investment or work,” respec-
tively (Fu et al. 2014, 230–231).
More interestingly, Taiwanese people appeared more concerned
about the political consequences of tightened economic relations than
the Ma Ying-jeou government, whose promotion of CSSTA stressed
mostly the economic benefits without reassuring the public regarding
popular anxieties about losing political liberties. Respondents were
asked which conditions would contribute to a rise in popular support
for peaceful unification. In declining order, 54.5 percent chose
“closer economic ties with mainland China,” 44.2 percent “the ris-
ing international status and influence of the mainland Chinese gov-
ernment,” 15.3 percent “mainland China’s refusal to recognize the
sovereignty of the Republic of China,” and finally 7.0 percent chose
“the communist one-party rule of mainland China” (Fu et al. 2014,
210–211). Clearly there was a profound sense of uneasiness and vic-
timhood among Taiwanese people. 
In retrospect, the “30-second incident” could be seen as a threat
that encouraged movement participation. As noted, there was already
a sizable share of the public that was skeptical about closer economic
ties with China without being involved in the protest activities. The
KMT lawmakers’ controversial maneuver seemed to substantiate the
image of the CSSTA as an undemocratic “black box.” That Taiwan’s
democratic procedure suffered collateral damage in the effort to pro-
mote closer cross-strait economic integration lent credibility to the
claims of anti-CSSTA activists. It facilitated tapping into a latent seg-
ment of the population that was worried about the economic and
political consequences but remained detached from the CSSTA issue.
Later, one of the Sunflower leaders acknowledged that they should
have thanked Chang Ching-chung’s move for bringing the issue
national attention.6
Moreover, what happened on March 17 gave rise to an elite
realignment, pushing the DPP into firm opposition to the CSSTA. As
the main opposition party was torn between the lobbying of anti-
CSSTA activists and the electoral imperative to tone down their
China skepticism, it decided to insist on an article-by-article review
without clearly expressing its own attitude. As a matter of fact, on
March 13, the DPP publicized an opinion poll that revealed around
41 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with its anti-China
stance.7 Why the DPP leadership decided to release such information
amid the growing controversy over the CSSTA is intriguing. It was
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widely taken to be a symbolic gesture indicating the DPP’s willing-
ness to make concessions. Hence, it was no surprise that Sunflower
activists were highly critical of the DPP’s “ambiguity” prior to the
occupation of congress.8
Once the KMT lawmakers had opted to remove the review pro-
cedure, the DPP was deprived of its influence in modifying the
terms of cross-strait economic integration. As a polity member
under assault, the DPP came to support the Sunflower Movement in
trying to scrap the CSSTA entirely. During the twenty-four-day
seizure of congress, DPP lawmakers took shifts to secure freedom of
entry into the plenary conference chamber for the occupiers. The
DPP’s Department of Social Movements fielded liaison staff on a
rotating basis in order to provide the necessary supplies. On March
21, the DPP also mobilized its supporters nationwide to demonstrate
its determination to back up the students’ demands. In short, the
KMT’s unexpected legislative maneuver secured an elite ally for the
anti-CSSTA movement.
If the 30-second incident ended up as a threat and triggered an
elite realignment, it remained to be answered why the KMT lawmak-
ers decided to take this risk. There seemed to be two tactical missteps
on the part of KMT leaders. They clearly underestimated public anx-
iety over closer economic ties with China, and at the same time they
wrongly assumed that the DPP was the main obstacle to the passing
of the CSSTA. According to the DPP director of Chinese affairs, the
KMT government “made too little effort toward boosting public sup-
port.” He acknowledged the public attitude could be changed if the
government were able to launch a promotional campaign, analogous
to that of the ECFA in 2010. Tuan Yi-kang, the DPP lawmaker who
chaired the Internal Administration Committee before Chang Ching-
chung, was also surprised by the KMT’s hawkish response. In my
interview, Tuan admitted that if the KMT had decided to put the
CSSTA on review according to the original agreement, it would have
been difficult for the DPP to oppose the bill.
The Evolution of the Sunflower Movement
How the anti-CSSTA activists were able to seize the national legis-
lature and thus engender a stalemate depended on a number of short-
term political contingencies. The modified polity model pays atten-
tion to political opportunity, threat, and strategy-making, particularly
in a brief episode of intensive confrontation. Here I will analyze the
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twenty-four-day evolution of the Sunflower Movement in five differ-
ent stages.
Occupying the Congress, March 18–19
In response to the KMT’s unexpected rushing of the CSSTA through
the legislative agenda the previous day, the DF and BIY activists
secretly planned a guerilla-style protest, storming the compound of
the Legislative Yuan at 9 p.m. on March 18. As it panned out,
roughly fifty protesters were successful in mounting the premise’s
walls since the policemen were caught off guard. They gathered in
the courtyard and shouted slogans for a while, before breaking into
the plenary conference chamber. At 10 p.m., the number of protesters
had swelled to around 200 and they decided to hold their ground by
erecting makeshift barricades and setting up a leadership core. The
news that congress was being occupied was immediately broadcast
via Internet, attracting supporters to the area. By midnight, around
2,000 people had gathered on Qingdao East Road and Jinan Road to
demonstrate their solidarity (see Figure 1), effectively encircling the
policemen who attempted to remove the protesters from inside the
legislative building. Bottled water, food, first aid, medicine, and
other materials were quickly sent inside by supporters to sustain a
potentially prolonged protest. In hindsight, swift and spontaneous
logistical reaction made possible the radical act of seizing a govern-
ment building.
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Figure 1  The Legislative Yuan and Its Environs
The DF and BIY activists had previously promoted their agenda
mainly through institutional channels. They participated in public
hearings, staged protest rallies, and lobbied the opposition politi-
cians. In my interviews, the core activists revealed their private pes-
simism at having exhausted nearly all available channels before the
unanticipated turn on March 17. Therefore the KMT lawmakers’ rail-
roading of the CSSTA provided the perfect opportunity for the agree-
ment’s opponents. In the past, the BIY had launched protest rallies in
front of the Legislative Yuan several times. Thus, to mount a stronger
protest, the activists needed to raise the stakes. A sit-in within the
national legislature, rather than outside of it, seemed like a logical
step even though it involved law-breaking actions. The core activists
reckoned that the KMT lawmakers’ trampling of the rule of law jus-
tified their civil disobedience.
There were at least four rounds of scuffles between protesters
and policemen until the morning of March 19; however, the police’s
efforts to take back the plenary conference chamber failed for several
reasons. First, a misleading piece of information led the authorities to
deploy most of their police force near the presidential office on that
eventful night, leaving the Legislative Yuan weakly defended. Sec-
ond, the speedy mobilization of supporters outside of the legislative
building made the forcible evacuation difficult, if not impossible.
The authorities would have had to clear the growing crowd on Jinan
Road and Qingdao East Road before securing the occupied chamber.
Third, toward midnight, the chairpersons of the opposition DPP and
TSU parties and their politicians staged a sit-in protest in the court-
yard, which certainly raised the political cost of an aggressive oper-
ation by the authorities. Finally and perhaps more importantly, the
Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s attitude played a critical
role because police action within the legislative building required his
approval legally as well as politically. Wang appeared to agree to the
police order to evacuate the intruders in the first few hours, but later
on he adopted a more neutral position, not allowing more police rein-
forcements. Why did Wang appear to be accommodating to the radi-
cal act of seizing the Legislative Yuan given that there was no evi-
dence he opposed the CSSTA? Since the previous fall, Wang had
lodged a legal battle against Ma Ying-jeou to challenge the latter’s
decision to revoke his KMT party membership and thereby his lead-
ership in the national legislature. It happened that the result of the
first trial was scheduled to be announced on the afternoon of March
19, less than twelve hours after the occupation took place. If Wang
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lost the case, he would be immediately deprived of his party mem-
bership and the congressional leadership. There was no incentive for
Wang to assume a hard-liner’s position since that would have risked
his personal reputation and helped his political enemy.
The court awarded Wang Jin-pyng a clear victory in the first
round of his lawsuit. By that time, busloads of participants from cen-
tral and southern Taiwan had arrived and the crowd outside had
grown to tens of thousands. Clearly there was no longer the possibil-
ity that authorities could nip the Sunflower Movement in the bud as
the confrontation between protesters and the government escalated.
Wang’s neutrality was an instance of elite division that created
opportunity for the protesters. However, when the latter decided to
storm the Legislative Yuan, they had no idea about the outcome of
Wang’s pending trial, nor could they have predicted his decision not
to evict occupiers forcibly. Most likely, Wang’s hands-off stance was
a gambit for his ongoing power struggle with Ma, who had to shoul-
der greater political responsibility for a paralyzed legislature. If this
reasoning is correct, elite disunity per se did not automatically favor
contention, but was actually activated by movement strategy.9
Escalating the Confrontation vs. Nonresponsiveness,
March 20–24
On March 20, the Sunflower leaders formally raised their demands.
First they asked Wang Jin-pyng to rescind the conclusion made in the
30-second incident and send the CSSTA back for the article-by-
article review. Second, they requested an open dialogue with Ma
Ying-jeou on the CSSTA and CSAS issues. The government was
given twenty-four hours to consider these demands, which failed to
elicit any response from the KMT incumbents. On the evening of
March 21, the Sunflower leaders invited supporters to stage a sit-in
protest at the KMT party branch offices nationwide to increase pres-
sure on the government. According to journalistic sources, at least
eighteen local KMT offices were besieged by protest crowds, some
for several days. In major cities such as Taichung, Tainan, and Kaoh-
siung, thousands attended spontaneous rallies.
The KMT government chose not to respond to this political cri-
sis initially. Ma Ying-jeou required Wang Jin-pyng to deal with the
protesters, but the request was rejected by Wang. Then, on March 22,
Premier Jiang Yi-huah came to meet the student representatives face
to face, but he explicitly refused their demands to withdraw the
CSSTA and legislate the CSAS. The next day Ma Ying-jeou con-
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vened a press conference in which he denounced the illegal behavior
of the students and stressed the economic advantages of CSSTA.
While Ma and Jiang adopted a hard-line attitude, other KMT
heavyweights signaled their relative tolerance. On March 20, Taipei
City mayor Hau Lung-pin expressed his respect for “the students’
reasonable demands” and disapproved of forcible eviction as a solu-
tion.10 Two days later, New Taipei City mayor Chu Li-luan expressed
a similar sentiment, praising the “democratic motives” among stu-
dents.11 Since Hau and Chu were both potential successors to Ma,
their more conciliatory gestures toward the movement reflected
deliberate efforts to distance themselves from Ma and Jiang. The
apparent split within the KMT leadership not only made it more dif-
ficult to resort to police eviction, but also gave more latitude to the
Sunflower activists.12
Seeing that their occupation had failed to bring forth positive
responses, the Sunflower protesters decided to escalate tensions.
Right after Ma’s press conference, they appealed for the convening
of a citizens’ constitutional conference to solve the ongoing political
crisis. The calls for students to boycott class (bake) and for a general
strike (bagong) were also issued. Outside of the core leadership in
the occupied chamber, there was another group of students who
attempted to steer the movement onto a more radical course. After
several rounds of fruitless negotiations, they secretly decided to tar-
get the Executive Yuan, located one block away. At 7 p.m. on March
23, they launched a sit-in there and soon its front square was swarm-
ing with thousands of protesters. However, there were participants
who broke into the government building unexpectedly, creating an
excuse for the official crackdown. Starting at midnight on March 24,
the police used batons, shields, and water cannons to disperse the
crowd. More than 500 protesters were wounded, and some had
severe head injuries. The police arrested and interrogated sixty-one
persons. The police spent several hours taking back the Executive
Yuan, but the excessive use of force against a peaceful rally, which
was vividly captured on mobile phone cameras and quickly spread
via the Internet, shocked the public.
Groping for a Possible Breakthrough vs. Equivocation,
March 25–30
The suppression at the Executive Yuan triggered a leadership crisis in
the movement, as radicals and moderates were briefly plunged into
a spate of mutual recrimination. Soon after, the Sunflower Movement
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was able to rebuild their command structure establishing, on March
25, a thirty-person representative assembly (twenty students and ten
NGO activists) and a nine-person decisionmaking group (five stu-
dents, three professors, and one lawyer), which assumed movement
leadership by and large effectively until the end of the occupation.13
The protest on March 23 drew criticism for its attempt to para-
lyze the executive branch of the government. Moderate KMT leaders,
such as Hau Lung-pin, who had called for tolerance a few days
before, now stood for law and order. In hindsight, the action stopped
further polarization among the KMT leadership—a key resource that
would have been helpful to the Sunflower Movement.
Yet, on balance, the result was still greater pressure on Ma and
Jiang. The disproportionate use of force to drive away the protesters
from the Executive Yuan, on the other hand, backfired, as the govern-
ment was criticized for “state violence” (guojia baoli). The official
attempt to whitewash the degree of violence flew in the face of video
images showing people who were battered, bleeding, and uncon-
scious. As a result, the KMT incumbents made a minor concession to
the mounting pressure from public opinion. On March 25, the presi-
dential office reversed its previous aloofness by showing willingness
to meet student representatives unconditionally. Four days later, Ma
held the second press conference in which he opened by praising the
Sunflower Movement as “the concrete practice of the youth demon-
strating their social concern and democratic participation” and then
proceeded to respond to the demands “positively.” Ma claimed to
personally support the codification of CSAS, but insisted its legisla-
tion could proceed simultaneously with the legal review of CSSTA.
As for the citizens’ constitutional conference, Ma asserted that an
alternative form of meeting ought to do the job. Nevertheless, he
rejected the most important demand to withdraw the CSSTA. On
April 1, the Executive Yuan finished a CSAS draft, which was no
more than a restatement of the current practice of cross-strait negoti-
ations. Two days later, the government declared a “national confer-
ence on economics and trade” (jingmao guoshi huiyi) would be forth-
coming, which amounted to a purposeful distortion of what protesters
had originally demanded. Clearly the government now practiced a
strategy of equivocation, putting on a responsive and humane facade
to defuse the pressure without really meeting any of the protesters’
demands.
The Sunflower leaders learned a bitter lesson in the first week.
The nationwide sit-in at the KMT party branch offices ran out of
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steam in a few days, and only one labor union responded to the call
for a general strike. Although thousands of students continued to
gather and camp outside the Legislative Yuan, only a few college
departments ceased their regular teaching schedules. The incident at
the Executive Yuan showed the futility of increasing pressure by
occupying another government building. The tactical options for the
Sunflower activists were visibly narrowed, and they now had to pro-
ceed more cautiously. On March 27, the movement leadership
decided to hold a large-scale protest rally. On the same day, they also
launched a signature campaign inviting lawmakers from all parties to
pledge to legislate the CSAS as their first priority. The student lead-
ers made it clear that they would withdraw from the Legislative Yuan
as long as they collected the agreement from more than half of the
lawmakers—the first indication by the Sunflower leaders that they
were willing to make some concessions.
The signature campaign was designed to drive a wedge between
the KMT lawmakers and Ma Ying-jeou. It was hoped that the former
would act independently, thus thwarting Ma’s intransigence and gain-
ing the movement new leverage. In tandem with this strategic reori-
entation, the Sunflower leaders toned down their criticism of KMT
lawmakers. Initially, Wang Jyn-ping was also condemned as being
equally responsible for the 30-second incident; now, with the new
strategy specifically targeting the internal split within the KMT,
Wang had to be treated with respect in order to win the support of
pro-Wang lawmakers.
On March 30, the rally rolled out much more successfully than
expected. The Sunflower leaders had been worried that fewer than
100,000 people would show up and the torrential rain the previous
day did not bode well for them. There was discussion as to whether
they should scale down their demands by conceding to Ma’s proposal
to simultaneously process the CSSTA and CSAS. It turned out to be
a sunny Sunday, and 500,000 were estimated to have taken part in
this unprecedented event. Right before the concluding speech at 7
p.m., the leaders decided to stick to the original four demands, thus
dragging the stalemate into the third week.
Maintaining the Stalemate vs. Preparing for Crackdown,
March 31–April 5
For the Sunflower leadership, it was as discouraging that a success-
ful mass rally failed to bring out more concessions from the KMT
government as it was alarming that the crowd outside the Legislative
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Yuan began to shrink afterwards. Tens of thousands of people had
gathered and slept in Jinan Road and Qingdao East Road for nearly
two weeks, and it was clear many participants were exhausted. With
midterm exams coming soon, many students also left and returned to
school. On April 1, an avowedly pro-China mafia boss threatened to
bring his followers to enter the occupied plenary conference chamber
by force, and that menace triggered a temporary surge in crowds to
protect the Sunflower protesters. However, that only lasted one day
and failed to reenergize the movement’s declining momentum.
The first few days in April witnessed the nadir of movement
morale. No KMT lawmaker would come out to sign the pledge to pri-
oritize the CSAS, and popular approval for the occupation declined
(see Table 1). Among the core participants, how to manage an
orderly and dignified exit became an open topic. The only initiative
that came out of the Sunflower leadership in the third week was to
hold a “people’s congress” on April 5 and 6, in which more than
1,000 participants joined a deliberative forum on CSAS and the
citizens’ constitutional conference. All they could do was prolong
the precarious stalemate, and they were no longer to launch any
offensives.
Fortunately, spontaneously formed groups somewhat made up
the lost momentum in this period. Democracy Kuroshio (minzhu
heichao), a student organization primarily from southern Taiwan,
started a series of street demonstrations at the local offices of KMT
lawmakers from April 4 to 9. A netizen-initiated organization called
Appendectomy Project (gelanwei) entered the fray, and they created
Internet platforms (a website and app) to collect signatures in an
attempt to recall some KMT lawmakers. Beez (xiaomifeng) was a
decentralized organization formed on April 3, with more than 100
cells (which they called “beehives”) all over Taiwan. Beez activists
staged street speech and singing actions and distributed leaflets.
While there was a creative diversification of movement strategies,
the Sunflower leaders were facing the dismal prospect of losing pop-
ular support. Table 1 presents the results of opinion surveys from
March 21 to April 3. It shows that the failed sit-in protest at the Exec-
utive Yuan on March 23 did not reduce public sympathy, yet the suc-
cessful rally on March 30 was followed by declining support. Clearly
public tolerance of the occupation grew thinner as it dragged on.
Seeing the exhaustion of movement vitality and support, the gov-
ernment tried to engineer a favorable atmosphere for an eventual
forced evacuation. Changing its previously conciliatory tone, the
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KMT incumbents now voiced harsh criticism and warnings. On April
3, the KMT general secretary vehemently denounced the student
protest as antidemocratic, and Jiang Yi-hua also criticized the stu-
dents for being unreasonable in escalating their demands. A dubious
piece of news asserted that Wang Jin-pyng claimed the use of police
force did not need his approval, but he later denied this. The follow-
ing day, policemen in full antiriot gear appeared. On April 5, the DPP
held an emergency press conference to warn the government not to
use force. All these signs indicated that the KMT incumbents were
ready for a final showdown with the protesters.
An Exit with Dignity, April 6–10
As the Sunflower Movement was heading toward a tragic denoue-
ment, Wang Jin-pying’s timely intervention tipped the balance in
favor of the movement. During the morning of April 6, Wang arrived
at the occupied chamber unexpectedly and read a carefully worded
announcement. He congratulated the idealistic devotion of student
activism and pointed out that a working national legislature needed
the ruling party’s tolerance, the opposition party’s wisdom, and the
support of the citizens. To solve the present crisis, he pledged not to
convene the interparty caucus discussion on the CSSTA before the
CSAS law was legislated. After reading his announcement, Wang
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Table 1  Support and Disapproval Ratings for the Congress 
Occupation (in percentages)
Date 3/21 3/23 3/24 3/25 3/26 3/30 3/31 4/3
Support 48 65 51 70 63 55 48 26
Disapproval 40 27 38 20 20 36 38 33
Sources: Four of the listed surveys come from the pro-KMT TVBS Poll Center (http://home
.tvbs.com.tw/poll_center); one each from the pro-DPP Taiwan Brain Trust (http://goo.gl/MRc
BUo) and Liberty Times Poll Center (http://goo.gl/XSblNz); and the other two from more neu-
tral sources, Business Today (http://goo.gl/9X5E5A) and the Taiwan Indicators Survey Research
(http://goo.gl/uZFb7V), all accessed on September 22, 2014. 
Notes: There were twelve opinion polls released during the twenty-four-day period, of which
only three did not explicitly ask the respondents their opinion of the students’ occupation of con-
gress. I chose not to include the survey by the official National Development Council on April
2 due to its tendentious, leading question. 
I use the last day of data collection if the survey spanned more than one day. 
The final survey on April 3 asked whether the students should continue their occupation of
the Legislative Yuan (26 percent), terminate their protest (33 percent), or choose another site for
the protest (23 percent).
made a brief visit to the occupied chamber, paying his respects to the
protesters inside. The Sunflower leaders knew of Wang’s visit only
one hour in advance, and they quickly decided to adopt a cautious
response, “not shouting slogans nor shaking hands with him.”
Wang Jin-pying claimed his intervention became necessary
because his efforts in bringing the KMT and DPP congress leaders to
a compromise had failed due to their polarized stances. It was also
likely that Wang sought to prevent potential bloodshed in the national
legislature, which might have damaged his political career. For the
Sunflower leadership, Wang was offering a better deal than Ma since
his proposal was closer to the movement’s demand to legislate CSAS
before reviewing the CSSTA, although there remained the possibility
that the KMT lawmakers could again railroad the CSSTA unilaterally
without an agreement in the interparty caucus discussion.
With a depleted movement, Wang’s move also forced the Sun-
flower leaders to respond in a constructive way. Immediately after
Wang’s visit, the student leaders held a press conference to hint that
a solution was looming. For the next twenty hours, student leaders
and NGO activists were busy with internal meetings on how to man-
age a dignified exit. On the evening of April 7, the Sunflower leaders
declared that their occupation would end three days later. Although
there were complaints that the decision to withdraw was made with-
out proper consultation and reluctance on the part of some die-hard
activists to leave, a cheerful and celebrative farewell rally was held
on the evening of April 10 and the Sunflower leaders vowed to con-
tinue their anti-CSSTA efforts.
It was true that Sunflower participants needed some time to clean
up the plenary conference chamber, which had become an embattled
campground for the past three weeks, and they had to manage the
logistical problems of stockpiled materials and money donated by
supporters. However, the decision to leave on April 10 (Thursday)
was also strategic. Since Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan regularly con-
vened plenary meetings on Friday, and KMT incumbents had been
airing the possibility of holding the meeting elsewhere due to the
occupation, the Sunflower leaders considered leaving a ready-to-use
plenary conference chamber before the morning of April 11 to be a
strategic choice so that the authorities would not have the excuse to
hold it elsewhere.
For the KMT government, Wang’s mediation came as an embar-
rassment. His endorsement of the demand to legislate the CSAS as a
precondition of reviewing the CSSTA ran counter to Ma’s insistence
on the simultaneous processing of both. Wang’s move was clearly an
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indication of the widening rift among the KMT leadership. Previ-
ously Wang and Ma clashed over a number of issues, but their dis-
agreement did not include cross-strait policy. Again, the occupation
intensified a preexisting intra-elite split in favor of the students.
Wang’s cautiously worded statement indicated his support for more
oversight over the negotiation with China—a clear endorsement for
the Sunflower Movement’s reprioritized demands since the second
week of the protest. 
Apparently the KMT caucus did not know of Wang’s intentions
in advance, which is why they later condemned Wang as a “traitor to
the party.” On April 7 the presidential office released a statement in
an attempt to rationalize the conspicuous difference between Ma and
Wang. It meekly acknowledged that Wang at least did not oppose
putting the CSSTA on review. Consequently, the political rivalry
within the ruling party helped the Sunflower Movement in claiming
a victorious result: the protesters framed their decision to withdraw
from the Legislative Yuan as “a turn from defensive to offensive by
leaving the fortress to sow more seeds” (zhuanshou weigong
chuguan bozhong).14 In other words, although they failed in pressur-
ing the government to scrap the free trade bill, they still succeeded in
preventing a swift passage of CSSTA and in putting CSAS on the
legislative agenda.
Discussion
The above section reconstructs the evolution of the twenty-four-day
congress occupation from the perspective of opportunity, threat, and
strategy. It is intended as a simplified, though not overly simplistic,
model to condense the greatest episode of collective contention in
Taiwan’s political history. My analysis highlights the fact that social
movements and the government are inevitably engaged in “an itera-
tive strategic dance” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 84).
The narrative confirms several observations about the dynamics
of such protest, including how repression can backfire and the diffi-
culty of sustaining collective action over time. The KMT govern-
ment’s decision to play tough with the sit-in protest at the Executive
Yuan might have stemmed further radicalization among movement
activists, but it came with the cost of being seen as excessively
repressive toward a peaceful crowd. That the government back-
tracked from its initial nonresponsiveness to a slightly more accom-
modating stance was related to the intensive media coverage of
police violence.
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The above analysis also indicates the inherent difficulties in
maintaining a stalemate over a prolonged period of time. In the initial
stage, popular indignation and enthusiasm are still fresh because of
the urgent sense of threat; however, as the protest drags on, frustra-
tion and exhaustion creep in, which makes the standoff between pro-
testers and the government increasingly unstable. Antiregime protest-
ers need the stalemate in order to conduct political bargaining with
the incumbents, yet it is obvious that time usually does not stand on
their side. Taiwan’s Sunflower activists did not foresee a twenty-
four-day war of attrition when they first stormed the parliamentary
complex on March 18. Over the more than three-week period, their
mobilizing capacity steadily declined, putting them in a highly vul-
nerable position. The sense of threat, previously a facilitating factor
for movement participation, began to diminish because students had
effectively paralyzed the national legislature. In hindsight, the great-
est strategic success of the Sunflower Movement consisted in its rad-
ical action of occupying the national legislature, which not only
secured elite sponsorship by pushing the opposition party to an anti-
CSSTA stand, but also engineered an elite split within the ruling
party. Political opportunities facilitated protest-making as long as the
activists were able to deploy appropriate strategies.
Finally, the strategic perspective confirms that unity is a critical
asset in managing a political stalemate. The strife between moderates
and radicals within the Sunflower Movement led to the weakly
planned sit-in protest at the Executive Yuan. After a brief period of
confusion, the movement activists quickly reestablished a leadership
structure that succeeded in avoiding further splits until the very end.
The KMT incumbents, on the other hand, suffered from their intense
infighting. In fact, it was largely due to the personal rivalry between
Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng that protesters were able to take
hold of the plenary conference chamber on March 18 and also con-
clude their protest with a claim of success on April 10. Therefore the
story of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement confirms a key finding in the
literature of social movement studies: elite disunity is often a precon-
dition of successful protests.
Conclusion
The spring of 2014 witnessed a massive antiregime protest in Tai-
wan. By occupying the Legislative Yuan, the Sunflower Movement
generated a political crisis in which protesters were engaged in a sus-
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tained standoff with the government. During those eventful twenty-
four days, there was speculation about where the stalemate was head-
ing. It was fortunate for Taiwan that bloodshed and polarization were
avoided. The occupation ended in a peaceful and orderly manner.
It is difficult to produce a balance sheet for the Sunflower Move-
ment because doing so depends on the time horizon one uses to eval-
uate its impact. An immediate account on April 10, when the students
ended their occupation, indicated a clear success for the Sunflower
Movement since it derailed Ma Ying-jeou’s plan for a quick passage
of the CSSTA and won support for more supervision over cross-strait
negotiation from the KMT leaders.
An intermediate observation six months later seems a bit more
complicated. After the Sunflower Movement, Ma Ying-jeou reiter-
ated his personal commitment to hasten the review of CSSTA and
government officials resumed the negotiation over a goods trade
agreement with China, still without public oversight. Yet, at the time
of this writing (October 2014), with the widened rift among the
KMT, the entrenched opposition from the DPP, and an upcoming
local election, it was highly questionable whether Ma Ying-jeou
could risk another 30-second incident without incurring a similar if
not greater backlash. Past mobilization and splits within the KMT did
serve as an effective constraint on the government. 
In this article I attempt to answer the questions of which factors
engendered such large-scale protest and how the activists managed to
obtain a favorable outcome in spite of the adverse political circum-
stances. It is true that the KMT’s parliamentary tactic to rush through
the CSSTA in the 30-second incident was a gross miscalculation that
fueled public anger by manufacturing an instant threat to those who
might be concerned but not spurred into action by the CSSTA alone.
Thus, by resisting the CSSTA in a high-profile manner, the Sun-
flower Movement actually struck a chord with many citizens.
Once the congress was occupied, the movement trajectory gener-
ated its own developmental logic that was not entirely foreseeable
from the preexisting conditions. I have demonstrated that the twenty-
four-day course of the Sunflower Movement was punctuated by a
series of strategic interactions. Ultimately, the disunity within the rul-
ing party offered a favorable opportunity for Sunflower activists to
paralyze the working of the national legislature for more than three
weeks and to claim success when they ended their occupation.
Finally, a modified polity model analysis points out why radical
protest such as occupying congress is rare. Elites are seldom in such
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a disharmonious state as to lend leverage to protesters. Neither do
they often make mistakes that corroborate the worst fears that move-
ment activists have struggled to emphasize. It takes a felicitous com-
bination of opportunity, threat, and skillful movement leadership to
manufacture a challenge of such magnitude. That these factors are
usually not simultaneously present explains the stability of political
order even when the incumbents are promoting some highly unpop-
ular policies. 
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hong Lin and Tieh-chih Chang. I appreciate the assistance by Chun-hao
Huang, Mei Lan Huang, and Yun-Nung Lu. Finally, the article benefits from
the suggestions of two anonymous reviewers and Stephan Haggard.
1. The appellation is fortuitous because a florist sent sunflowers to show
his support in the first few days, then the media caught the image and started
to label it that way. There were some activists who preferred to call it the
March 18 Movement.
2. http://goo.gl/jXH1Xk (accessed October 22, 2014).
3. See the TVBS poll report, http://goo.gl/5nNteI (accessed September
17, 2014).
4. The anti-CSSTA activists had always suspected the DPP’s position on
this controversial pact. On a later press occasion, Wei Yang, a BIY leader,
claimed the DPP politicians maintained an “ambiguous” attitude toward the
CSSTA before March 18 mainly because some of them had business deals in
China. http://goo.gl/fAopYC (accessed July 7, 2014).
5. http://goo.gl/W6Nzjh (accessed June 16, 2014).
6. Wu Zheng expressed this remark in an invited talk in Taipei, Septem-
ber 20, 2014; author’s field notes.
7. See http://goo.gl/xbn9iI (accessed September 22, 2014).
8. Wei Yang, a BIY activist, criticized the DPP in this regard. See
http://goo.gl/Yu9zpS (accessed September 22, 2014). 
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9. Actually, anti-CSSTA activists originally planned to stage a sit-in in
front of the presidential office in the evening of March 17, but they decided
to shift the target to the Legislative Yuan in the afternoon of the following
day. Had they proceeded with the earlier plan, the Ma-Wang rivalry could
not have become a favorable opportunity for the protesters since there would
be less pressure on Wang to intervene in this dispute.
10. See http://goo.gl/2xwJ64 (accessed September 22, 2014).
11. See http://goo.gl/WMwxUK (accessed September 22, 2014).
12. In fact, this was not the first time that Hau Lung-ping and Chu Li-
luan chose to take sides with social movements in open defiance against Ma
Ying-jeou’s leadership. Reflecting the growth of antinuclear voices in the
wake of the Fukushima incident, Hau and Chu had been expressing similar
remarks since 2012; see Ho (2014b).
13. Incidentally, one of the reasons the Sunflower Movement was able
to rebuild its command structure in the aftermath of the Executive Yuan inci-
dent was because the radical activists who led the sit-in on March 23 either
went into hiding from the police manhunt or were so frustrated that they left
the movement for a time. Their exodus, voluntary or not, effectively ended
the leadership struggle that plagued the movement during the first few days
of the occupation. Consequently the leadership was consolidated within the
group of core activists who remained inside the Legislative Yuan throughout
the movement.
14. See note 2.
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